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Growing like China
Abstract
This paper constructs a growth model that is consistent with salient features of the recent Chinese
growth experience: high output growth, sustained returns on capital investment, extensive reallocation
within the manufacturing sector, falling labor share and accumulation of a large foreign surplus. The
building blocks of the theory are asymmetric financial imperfections and heterogeneous productivity.
Some firms use more productive technologies, but low-productivity firms survive because of better
access to credit markets. Due to the financial imperfections, high-productivity firms — which are run by
entrepreneurs — must be financed out of internal savings. If these savings are sufficiently large, the
high-productivity firms outgrow the low-productivity firms and attract an increasing employment share.
The downsizing of the financially integrated firms forces a growing share of domestic savings to be
invested in foreign assets, generating a foreign surplus. A calibrated version of the theory can account
quantitatively for China's growth experience during 1992-2007.
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Abstract
This paper constructs a growth model that is consistent with salient features of
the recent Chinese growth experience: high output growth, sustained returns on
capital investment, extensive reallocation within the manufacturing sector, falling
labor share and accumulation of a large foreign surplus. The building blocks of
the theory are asymmetric financial imperfections and heterogeneous productivity.
Some firms use more productive technologies, but low-productivity firms survive
because of better access to credit markets. Due to the financial imperfections,
high-productivity firms — which are run by entrepreneurs — must be financed out
of internal savings. If these savings are sufficiently large, the high-productivity
firms outgrow the low-productivity firms and attract an increasing employment
share. The downsizing of the financially integrated firms forces a growing share
of domestic savings to be invested in foreign assets, generating a foreign surplus.
A calibrated version of the theory can account quantitatively for China’s growth
experience during 1992-2007.
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1 Introduction
Over the last thirty years, China has undergone a spectacular economic transformation
involving not only fast economic growth and sustained capital accumulation, but also
major shifts in the sectoral composition of output, increased urbanization and a growing
importance of markets and entrepreneurial skills. Reallocation of labor and capital across
manufacturing firms has been a key source of productivity growth. The rate of return
on investment has remained well above 20%, higher than in most industrialized and
developing economies. If investment rates have been high, saving rates have been even
higher: in the last fifteen years, China has experienced a growing net foreign surplus:
its foreign reserves swelled from 21 billion USD in 1992 (5% of its annual GDP) to 2,130
billion USD in June 2009 (46% of its GDP); see Figure 1.
FIGURE 1 HERE
The combination of high growth and high return to capital, on the one hand, and a
growing foreign surplus, on the other hand, is puzzling. A closed-economy neoclassical
growth model predicts that the high investment rate would lead to a fall in the return
to capital. An open-economy model predicts a large net capital inflow rather than an
outflow, owing to the high domestic return to capital. In this paper, we propose a
theory of economic transition that solves this puzzle while being consistent with salient
qualitative and quantitative features of the Chinese experience. The focal points of
the theory are financial frictions and firms’ reallocation of resources across firms. In
our theory, both the sustained return to capital and the foreign surplus arise from
the reallocation of capital and labor from less productive externally financed firms to
entrepreneurial firms that are more productive, but have less access to external financing.
As financially integrated firms shrink, a larger proportion of the domestic savings is
invested in foreign assets. Thus, the combination of high growth and high investment is
consistent with the accumulation of a foreign surplus.
Our paper is part of a recent literature arguing that low aggregate total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) — especially in developing countries — is the result of micro-level resource
misallocation (see Parente et al., 2000; Caselli and Coleman, 2002; Banerjee and Duflo,
2005; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Gancia and Zilibotti, 2009; and Hsieh and Klenow,
1
2009). While pockets of efficient firms using state-of-the-art technologies may exist, these
firms fail to attract the large share of productive resources that efficiency would dictate,
due to financial frictions and other imperfections. Most existing literature emphasizes
the effects of resource misallocation on average productivity. In contrast, our paper
argues that when a country starts from a situation of severe inefficiency, but manages
to ignite the engine of reallocation, it has the potential to grow fast over a prolonged
transition, since efficient firms can count on a highly elastic supply of factors attracted
from the less productive firms.
To analyze such a transition, we construct a model in which firms are heterogeneous
in productivity and access to financial markets. High-productivity firms are operated by
agents with entrepreneurial skills who are financially constrained and who must rely on
retained earnings to finance their investments. Low-productivity firms can survive due
to their better access to credit markets, since the growth potential of high-productivity
firms is limited by the extent of entrepreneurial savings. If the saving flow is sufficiently
large, high-productivity firms outgrow low-productivity ones, progressively driving them
out of the market. During the transition, the dynamic equilibrium has AK features:
within each type of firms, the rate of return to capital is constant due to labor mobility
and to the financial integration of the low-productivity firms. Due to a composition
effect, the aggregate rate of return to capital actually increases. Moreover, the economy
accumulates a foreign surplus. While investments in the expanding firms are financed
by the retained earnings of entrepreneurs, wage earners deposit their savings with inter-
mediaries who can invest them in loans to domestic firms and in foreign bonds. As the
demand for funds from financially integrated domestic firms declines, a growing share
of the intermediated funds must be invested abroad, building a growing foreign surplus.
This prediction is consistent with the observation that the difference between deposits
and domestic bank loans has been growing substantially, tracking China’s accumulation
of foreign reserves (see again Figure 1). After the transition, the economy behaves as
in a standard neoclassical model, where capital accumulation is subject to decreasing
returns.
Reallocation within the manufacturing sector — the driving force in our model — has
been shown to be an important source of productivity growth in China. In an influ-
ential paper, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimate that reallocation across manufacturing
firms with different productivity accounted for an annual 2 percentage point increase in
aggregate TFP during 1998—2005. Brandt et al. (2009) estimate that between 42% and
67% of the aggregate TFP growth in Chinese manufacturing was due to productivity
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differences between entering and exiting firms during 1998-2005.
Our theory yields several additional predictions consistent with the evidence of
China’s transition.
1. The theory predicts that the surplus — savings minus investment — should increase
with the share of entrepreneurial firms.
Consistent with this prediction, we find that the net surplus is significantly higher
in Chinese provinces in which the employment share of domestic private firms has
increased faster.
2. In our basic, benchmark model, all firms produce the same good and differ only
in TFP. We extend the theory to a two-sector model in which firms can specialize
in the production of more or less capital-intensive goods. This extended model
predicts that financially constrained firms with high TFP will specialize in labor-
intensive activities (even though they have no technological comparative advan-
tage). Thus, the transition proceeds in stages: first low-productivity firms retreat
into capital-intensive industries, and then they gradually vanish. This is consis-
tent with the observed dynamics of sectoral reallocation in China, where young
high-productivity private firms have entered extensively in labor-intensive sectors,
while old state-owned firms continue to dominate capital-intensive industries.
The theory is related to the seminal contribution of Lewis (1954), who constructs
a model of reallocation from agriculture to industry where the supply of labor in man-
ufacturing is unlimited due to structural overemployment in agriculture. While his
mechanism is similar in some respects to ours, productivity increases in his model rely
on some form of hidden unemployment in the traditional sector. Lewis’ theory captures
aspects of the reallocation between rural and urban areas in China, while our focus is
on the reallocation within the industrial sector. Our paper is also related to Ventura
(1997), who shows that in economies engaging in external trade, capital accumulation is
not subject to diminishing returns because resources are moved from labor-intensive to
capital-intensive sectors. Ventura’s model does not assume any initial inefficiency, nor
does it imply that TFP should grow within each industry — a key implication of our
theory.1
1In this respect, our work is related to the seminal papers of Kuznets (1966) and Chenery and
Syrquin (1975), who study soruces of productivity growth during economic transitions.
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Neither Lewis’ nor Ventura’s theory has any implication regarding trade imbalances.
Matsuyama (2004 and 2005) shows that financial frictions may induce trading economies
to specialize in industries in which they do not have a technological comparative advan-
tage. See also the work of Antras and Caballero (2009). In our model, by a similar
mechanism, less efficient firms can survive and even outgrow more productive ones. Our
two-sector extension also predicts that financial constraints generate specialization in
spite of the lack of any technological comparative advantage, though the mechanism is
different.
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) document that it is common to observe capital outflow
from fast-growing developing economies with high marginal product of capital. As in the
case of China, countries with fast TFP growth tend to have both large capital outflows
and large investment rates, while the opposite is true for slow-growing countries. They
label this finding the "allocation puzzle". Our theory can provide a rationale to this
observation. In a related paper, Buera and Shin (2009) focus on the current account
surpluses experienced by a number of Asian economies in the 1980s (with the notable
exception of China, which experienced current account deficits during the 1980s). Buera
and Shin argue — as we do — that financial frictions can contribute to the explanation of
this puzzle. While in our paper the foreign surplus is driven by the dwindling demand for
domestic borrowing, due to the declining financially integrated firms, they emphasize
increased domestic savings by agents who are planning to become entrepreneurs but
need to save to finance start-up costs.
A few recent papers address the more specific question of why China is accumulating
a large foreign surplus. Most papers emphasize the country’s high saving rate. Kuijs
(2005) shows that household and enterprise saving rates in China are, respectively, 11.8
and 8.6 percentage points higher than those in the United States. Demography, an
imperfect financial sector, and the lack of welfare and pension benefits are among the
factors proposed as explanations for this (e.g. Kraay, 2000). However, it remains unclear
why domestic savings are not invested domestically given the high rate of return to
capital in China. Mendoza et al. (2009) argue that this may be explained by differences
in financial development inducing savers in emerging economies to seek insurance in
safe US bonds (see also Caballero et al., 2008, and Sandri, 2009). Dooley et al. (2007)
propose a strategic political motive: the Chinese government would influence wages,
interest rates and international financial transactions so as to foster employment and
export-led growth.
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Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some empirical evidence of
China since 1992. Section 3 describes the benchmark model and characterizes equi-
librium. Section 4 discusses quantitative implications of the theory with the aid of a
calibrated economy. Section 5 presents an extension to a two-sector environment that
captures additional features of the Chinese transition. Section 6 concludes. A technical
Appendix available from our web pages contains the formal proofs.
2 The Transition of China: Empirical Evidence
2.1 Political Events and Macroeconomic Trends
China introduced its first economic reforms in December 1978. The early reforms re-
duced land collectivization, increased the role of local governments and communities,
and experimented with market reforms in a few selected areas. After a period of eco-
nomic and political instability, a new stage of the reform process was launched in 1992,
after Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, during which the leader spoke in favor of an accel-
eration of reforms. Since then, China has moved towards a full-fledged market economy.
The process gained momentum in 1997, as the 15th Congress of the Communist Party
of China officially endorsed an increase in the role of private firms in the economy.
The focus of this paper is on the post-1992 Chinese transition, a period characterized
by fast and stable growth and by a pronounced resource reallocation within the man-
ufacturing sector. In spite of very high investment rates (39% on average), the rate of
return to capital has remained stable: While the aggregate return to capital has fallen
slightly (from 28% in 1993 to 21% in 2005), the rate of return to capital in manufacturing
has been increasing since the early 1990s and climbed close to 35% in 2003, according
to Figure 11 in Bai et al. (2006). High corporate returns have not been matched by the
return on financial assets available to individual savers: the average real rate of return
on bank deposits, the main financial investment of Chinese households, was close to zero
during the same period. Wage growth has been lower than growth in output per capita
in recent years.2 Similarly, the labor share of aggregate output fell gradually from 59%
2According to Banister (2007, Table 10, based on the China Labor Statistical Yearbook) the average
real annual growth of wages in the urban manufacturing sector between 1992 and 2004 was 7.5 percent,
and a mere 4.6 percent if one excludes state-owned and collectively owned enterprises. In the same
period, the average growth rate of real GDP per capita was about 9 percent. Using data from the
NBS Urban Household Surveys 1992—2006, Ge and Yang (2009) report an annual growth rate of 4.1
percent for the basic wage (the lowest skill category) and of 6.2 percent for workers with "middle-
school education and below." These are useful benchmarks since they separate the wage growth due
to technological progress from that due to human capital accumulation — which reflects the increasing
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in 1998 to 47% in 2007 (Bai and Qian, 2009, Table 4).3 The falling labor share has
contributed to rising inequality even across urban households (Benjamin et al., 2008).
FIGURE 2 HERE
2.2 Reallocation in Manufacturing
The reallocation of capital and labor within the manufacturing sector is a focal point
of our paper. Figure 2 plots alternative measures of the evolution of the employment
share of private enterprises. Our preferred measure is based on annual firm-level surveys
conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), which include the universe of
Chinese industrial firms (manufacturing, mining and construction) with sales over 5 mil-
lion RMB. The solid line plots the proportion of domestic private enterprises (DPE) as a
percent of DPE plus state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the NBS surveys. It shows an in-
crease from 4% in 1998 to 56% in 2007. This is the most relevant measure for our theory.4
However, it excludes two important firm categories: foreign enterprises (FE) and collec-
tively owned enterprises (COE). Therefore, for completeness, we also report a broader
measure of the private employment share, namely, (DPE+FE)/(DPE+FE+SOE+COE),
see the dashed line. The NBS measures of private employment share could be biased
downwards, due to the exclusion of small firms and non-industrial firms. Therefore,
we also report the corresponding ratios from aggregate statistics from the China Labor
Statistical Yearbook (CLSY).5 According to this measure, the DPE/(DPE+SOE) share
was 19% in 1997 and 54% in 2007. All measures suggest that the share of DPE was low
until 1997 and that most of the transition took place thereafter. This accords well with
the political events outlined above.
quantity and quality of education. Two additional remarks are in order. First, wages are deflated using
the provincial consumer price index (CPI). The annual CPI growth rate was on average 0.9 percentage
points lower than that of the GDP deflator in these years. Second, the compliance rate for pension
contributions paid by employers declined dramatically in this period. Both considerations suggest that
the growth of labor costs per worker for firms was lower than the figures above.
3Bai and Qian (2009) report data until 2004. The estimates for 2004—07 were kindly provided by
Bai and Qian.
4NBS data are only available since 1998. The figure shows the share of firms classified as DPE by
the NBS. If, instead, we classify as DPE all firms with a private ownership share above 50%, the DPE
shares would rise from 12% in 1998 to 59% in 2007.
5One problem with the CLSY is that it does not classify ownership for all urban employment. More
precisely, the provincial data classifying employment according to ownership adds up to only 60% of
the aggregate measure of urban employment. The dotted line is then computed by assuming that the
ratio of DPE to SOE in the unclassified aggregate data is the same as that in the provincial data.
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2.3 Productivity and Credit Frictions
DPE and SOE differ in two important aspects: productivity and access to financial
markets. SOE are, on average, less productive and have better access to external credit
than do DPE. This makes ownership structure a natural proxy for the different types
of firms in our theory. Figure 3 shows a measure of profitability, i.e., the ratio of total
profits (measured as operation profits plus subsidies plus investment returns) to fixed
assets net of depreciation. Based on this measure, the gap between DPE and SOE is
about 9 percentage points per year, similar to that reported by Islam et al. (2006).6
Large productivity differences also emerge from TFP accounting: Brandt et al. (2008,
Table 17.3) estimate an average TFP gap between DPE and SOE of 1.8 during 1998—
2004, while Brandt and Zhu (2009) estimate a gap of 2.3 in 2004. Using a different
methodology, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimate a "revenue-TFP gap" of 1.42.
FIGURE 3 HERE
FIGURE 4 HERE
Financial and contractual imperfections are also well documented. In a cross-country
comparative study, Allen et al. (2005) find that China scores poorly in terms of creditor
rights, investor protection, accounting standards, non-performing loans and corruption.7
In this environment, Chinese firms must rely heavily on retained earnings to finance
investments and operational costs. Financial repression is far from uniform: private
firms are subject to strong discrimination in credit markets. The Chinese banks — mostly
state owned — tend to offer easier credit to SOE (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). As a
result, SOE can finance a larger share of their investments through external financing.
Figure 4 shows that SOE finance more than 30% of their investments through bank
loans compared to less than 10% for DPE. Similarly, Dollar and Wei (2007, Table 3.1)
6A concern with the official data is that the ownership classification is based on ownership at the
time of initial registration. However, many firms have subsequently been privatized. This problem is
addressed by Dollar and Wei (2007), who use survey data on 12400 firms, classified according to their
current ownership. They find the average return to capital to be twice as high in private firms as in
fully state-owned enterprises (Dollar and Wei, 2007, Table 6). Interestingly, collectively owned firms
also have a much higher productivity than SOE.
7Interestingly, some reforms of the financial system have been undertaken, including a plan to turn
the four major state-owned commercial banks into joint-stock companies. This effort involves consulting
foreign advisors to improve the managerial efficiency of banks (Kwan, 2006). In section 3.7 we discuss
the role of financial development during the economic transition.
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and Riedel et al. (2007, Table 3.1) report that private enterprises rely significantly less
on bank loans and significantly more on retained earnings and family and friends to
finance investments. Other forms of market financing are marginal for private firms.
Despite the rapid growth of the Chinese stock market in recent years, equity and debt
markets continue to play an insignificant role for DPE, while these markets have become
increasingly important for large semi-privatized SOE (Gregory and Tenev, 2001; and
Riedel et al., 2007, ch. 7).
Another sign that DPE are financially repressed is that both capital-output and
capital-labor ratios are substantially lower in DPE than in SOE. In 2006, the average
capital-output ratio was 1.75 in SOE and 0.67 in DPE (China Statistical Yearbook
(CSY), 2007). In the same year, the capital per worker was almost five times larger in
SOE than in DPE, although part of this difference reflects the higher average educational
attainment of SOE workers. This gap arises from both an intensive and an extensive
margin. First, SOE are more capital intensive even within three-digit manufacturing
industries, both in terms of capital per worker and in terms of the capital-output ratio
(Figure A1 in the Appendix). Second, DPE have taken over labor-intensive industries,
while the share of SOE remains high in capital-intensive industries. Panel 1 of Figure
5 plots the 2001 SOE share of total employment across three-digit manufacturing in-
dustries against the capital intensity that each of these industries had in the United
States (2001 is the first year for which data are available). Already in 2001 were SOE
significantly more represented in those industries which are more capital intensive in
the United States. For instance, the SOE employment share in the ten most capital-
intensive industries was 57.9%, while in the ten least capital-intensive industries it was
25.8%.8 The withdrawal of SOE from labor-intensive sectors has continued thereafter.
Panel 2 of Figure 5 plots the percentage change in the SOE employment share between
2001 and 2007 against the capital intensity of the corresponding industry in the United
States. The correlation coefficient is highly positive (0.576).
FIGURE 5 HERE
8Industries are classified according to the capital-labor ratio in the United States in 1996 (classifying
according to their respective Chinese ratios would create an endogeneity problem). The US data are
from NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, http://www.nber.org/nberces. We match the
industries listed by the China Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook (CIESY 2002, 2003 and 2004)
to the SIC codes. Among 31 industries in CIESY, only 27 can be matched, 18 at the SIC 2-digit level
and 9 at the SIC 3-digit level. Details are available upon request.
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2.4 Income Inequality
The economic transition of China has been accompanied by increasing income inequality
— even within the urban sector. For instance, the Gini coefficient of income in China
grew from 0.36 in 1992 to 0.47 in 2004. Our theory suggests that this development may
be due in part to the slow growth of wages relative to entrepreneurial income. The
pattern of income inequality across regions can offer some insight. We classify Chinese
provinces by the percentage of industrial workers who are employed in DPE. Figure
6 shows a high positive correlation between the Gini coefficient at the provincial level
in 2006 and the employment share of DPE: provinces with more private firms have a
substantially higher income dispersion.
FIGURE 6 HERE
2.5 Foreign Surplus and Productivity Growth
Finally, the reallocation process in manufacturing has an interesting statistical relation-
ship with the accumulation of a foreign surplus and the productivity growth. Consider,
first, the foreign surplus. At the aggregate level, the timing of structural change from
SOE to DPE follows quite closely that of the accumulation of foreign reserves: Both
accelerate around year 2000 (Figures 1 and 2). Interestingly, the breakdown of the net
surplus (savings minus investment) across provinces suggests the same pattern in the
cross section: The net surplus is systematically larger in provinces with a larger increase
in the DPE employment share.
We document this pattern by using data for 31 provinces with data from 2001 to
2007 from the NBS.9 The dataset allows us to construct province-level measurements
of investment in fixed assets and savings (defined as provincial GDP minus private and
government consumption expenditures). In column 1 of Table 1, we report the results
of regressing of the provincial net-surplus-to-GDP ratio on the annual change in the
employment share of DPE, defined as the employment in DPE divided by the sum of
employment in DPE and SOE at the province level. To avoid that the correlation be
driven by a common trend in the two variables, we include time dummies. The estimated
coefficient is positive and highly significant: a 10 percentage points larger increase in the
9The data cover all Chinese provinces for the years 2001—2003 and 2005—2007 (data for 2004 are not
available). The employment statistics for 2001—2003 are from CIESY 2002-2004. The CSY 2006-2008
provide data for 2005-2007. Annual data for investment, saving and GDP are from the CSY (2002-2008).
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DPE employment share is associated with an average 10 percentage point larger net
surplus relative to GDP.10 Controlling for lagged provincial GDP per capita reduces the
estimated coefficient from 1.0 to 0.89, which is significant at the 10% confidence level.11
Consider, next, productivity growth. Columns 3-4 of Table 1 show that labor pro-
ductivity has grown faster in provinces where the DPE employment share has grown
faster. A 10 percentage points larger increase in the DPE share is associated with a
1.9 percentage points higher annual productivity growth rate. Similar evidence emerges
from looking at the variation of the speed of reallocation across industries, see columns
5-6.12 In this case, a direct measure of the DPE employment share is not available before
2005, so we use the employment share of non-SOE over total employment as a measure
of reallocation. The coefficient of interest is positive and significant. The quantitative
effect is even larger: a 10 percentage points larger increase in the non-SOE employment
share is associated with a 14.3 percentage points higher growth rate of productivity. The
correlation is strengthened when controlling for industry-specific lagged productivity.
TABLE 1 HERE
The province-level results of columns 1-4 are mainly driven by cross-province vari-
ation. The estimated coefficients become smaller and statistically insignificant when
province fixed effects are included (only marginally insignificant in the productivity re-
gressions of columns 3-4). In contrast, the cross-industry results hold up to the inclusion
of industry fixed effects, which leave the estimated coefficient almost unchanged. Thus
the results of section 5-6 are mostly driven by within-industry variation.
10There is also a positive and highly significant (>99%) correlation between the ratio of net surplus
to provincial GDP and the level of the DPE employment share. A 10 percentage points difference in
the DPE employment share is associated with a 3.5 percentage point larger net surplus relative to GDP.
In the theory presented in section 3, both a high level and a high growth of the DPE share increase the
foreign surplus, consistent with the evidence in Table 1.
11All regressions described in this subsection are of the form
DEP_V ARrt = αt + β1 ·
¡
EMPLPRIVrt −EMPLPRIVrt−1
¢
+ εrt,
where the dependent variable, DEP_V ARrt, is the provincial net surplus (savings minus investments)
over GDP in columns 1 and 2, the growth rate of provincial GDP pc in columns 3 and 4, and the growth
rate of the industry-level value added per worker in columns 5 and 6. EMPLPRIVrt denotes the DPE (or
non-SOE, as discussed in the text) employment share. In columns 2, 4 and 6, control for lagged GDP
per capita (value added per worker) is included. αt denotes time-dummies, included in all regressions.
Standard errors are clustered at the province (industry) level. The coefficient of interest is β1.
12The data cover 28 major manufacturing industries. The sample period is 2001-07 (data for 2004
are not available). The data for 2001-03 are from the CIESY (2002-04). The data for 2005-07 are from
the CSY (2006-08).
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3 The Benchmark Model
In this section, we develop a theory of economic transition consistent with the empirical
facts documented in the previous section.
3.1 Preferences, Technology and Markets
Preferences and Population: The model economy is populated by overlapping gen-
erations of two-period lived agents who work in the first period and live off savings in
the second period. Preferences are parameterized by the following time-separable utility
function:
Ut =
(c1t)
1− 1θ − 1
1− 1θ
+ β
(c2t+1)
1− 1θ − 1
1− 1θ
, (1)
where β is the discount factor and θ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption ct. We focus on the case when agents’ savings are non-decreasing in the
rate of return, i.e., when θ ≥ 1.
Agents have heterogeneous skills. Each cohort consists of a measure Nt of agents
with no entrepreneurial skills (workers), and a measure μNt of agents with entrepre-
neurial skills (entrepreneurs), whose skills are transmitted from parents to children.13
The population grows at the exogenous rate ν; hence, Nt+1 = (1 + ν)Nt. The rate ν
captures demographic trends, including migration from rural to urban areas, assumed
to be exogenous, for simplicity.
Technology: There are two types of firms, both requiring capital and labor as well
as one manager. Financially integrated (F) firms are owned by intermediaries (to be
defined below) and operate as standard neoclassical firms. Entrepreneurial (E) firms
are owned by old entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs are residual claimants on the profits
and hire their own children as managers. The key assumption is that, due to financial
and contractual imperfections, some firms (F firms) have access to the deep pocket of
banks, which are perfectly integrated in international financial markets. Other firms
(E firms) are owned by agents who have superior skills and can run more productive
technologies. However, there are frictions restricting the flow of funds from the agents
with a deep pocket to those with superior skills. As a result, the latter end up being
credit constrained. This, in turn, allows less productive firms to survive in equilibrium.
13Lowercase characters will denote per capita or firm-level variables; upper case, aggregate variables.
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Different microfoundations would be consistent with this form of credit constraints
to arise in equilibrium. Here, we present one such example: Following Acemoglu et
al. (2007), we assume that each firm can choose between two modes of production:
Either the firm delegates decision authority to its manager, or it retains direct control
of strategic decisions. There is a trade-off. On the one hand, delegation leads to higher
total factor productivity (TFP) — e.g., the manager makes decisions based on superior
information. Thus, a firm delegating authority can attain χ > 1 extra efficiency units
per worker compared with a firm retaining centralized authority. On the other hand,
delegation raises an agency problem: the manager can divert a positive share of the
firm’s output for his own use. Such opportunistic behavior can only be deterred by
paying managers a compensation that is at least as large as the output which they could
steal. The key assumption is that entrepreneurs are better at monitoring their managers,
so that E firm managers can only steal a share ψ < 1 of output. In contrast, F firms
are weak at corporate governance and cannot effectively monitor their managers: under
delegation, all output would be stolen. Thus, F firms will always choose a centralized
organization, while E firms opt for delegation, given a condition that will be spelled out
below.
The technology of F and E firms are described, respectively, by the following pro-
duction functions:
yFt = kαFt (AtnFt)
1−α , yEt = kαEt (χAtnEt)
1−α ,
where y is output and k and n denote capital and labor, respectively. Capital depreciates
fully after one period. In the case of F firms, the input of the manager is equivalent to
that of a regular worker and is included in nF . The technology parameter A grows at
an exogenous rate z; At+1 = (1 + z)At.
Savings: Young workers earn a wage w and deposit their savings with a set of com-
petitive intermediaries (banks) paying a gross interest rate Rd. These workers choose
savings so as to maximize utility, (1), subject to an intertemporal budget constraint, cW1t+
cW2t+1/Rd = wt.This yields the optimal savings sWt = ζ
Wwt, where ζW ≡
¡
1 + β−θR1−θ
¢−1
.
Young entrepreneurs in E firms earn a managerial compensation, mt. Their savings can
be invested either in bank deposits or in their family business.
Banks: Banks collect savings from workers and invest in loans to domestic firms and
foreign bonds. The bonds yield a gross return R. Contractual imperfections plague the
relationship between banks and entrepreneurs. The output of E firms is non-verifiable,
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and entrepreneurs can only pledge to repay a share η of the second-period net profits.14.
In a competitive equilibrium, the rate of return on domestic loans must equal the rate
of return on foreign bonds, which in turn must equal the deposit rate. However, lending
to firms is subject to an iceberg cost ξ, which captures operational costs, red tape, etc.
Thus, ξ is an inverse measure of the efficiency of intermediation. In equilibrium, Rd = R
and Rl = R/ (1− ξ) , where Rl is the lending rate to domestic firms.15
F firms: Profit maximization implies that Rl equals the marginal product of F firms’
capital and that wages equal the marginal product of labor:
wt = (1− α)
³ α
Rl
´ α
1−α
At. (2)
E firms: The value of a firm owned by an old entrepreneur with capital kEt is the
solution to the following problem:
Ξt (kEt) = max
mt,nEt
©
(kEt)
α (χAtnEt)
1−α −mt − wtnEt
ª
(3)
subject to the incentive constraint that mt ≥ ψ (kEt)α (AEtnEt)1−α , where mt is, again,
the payment to the manager, and arbitrage in the labor market implies that the wage
is as in (2).16 The optimal contract implies that the incentive constraint is binding:
mt = ψ (kEt)
α (χAtnEt)
1−α . (4)
Taking the first-order condition with respect to nE and substituting in the equilibrium
wage given by (2) yields that
nEt = ((1− ψ)χ)
1
α
³ α
Rl
´− 1
1−α kEt
χAt
. (5)
Plugging (4) and (5) into (3) yields the value of the firm:
Ξt (kEt) = (1− ψ)
1
α χ
1−α
α RlkEt ≡ ρEkEt, (6)
where ρE is the E firm rate of return to capital. In order to ensure that ρE > Rl, we
make the following assumption.
14The assumption that output is not verifiable rules out that financially integrated firms hire old
entrepreneurs. If the entrepreneurs could commit to repay, all firms would be run by private entrepre-
neurs.
15In the analysis of this section, ξ plays no role, so we could set ξ = 0 without loss of generality.
However, ξ will become important in the extension about financial development.
16The managerial compensation must also exceed the workers’ wage rate (mt > wt). We restrict
attention to parameters such that the participation constraint is never binding in equilibrium.
In constrast, F firms are not subject to any incentive constraint since their managers make no dis-
cretionary decisions. Thus, the managers’ participation constraint is binding, and they earn the same
wage as ordinary workers.
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Assumption 1 χ > χ ≡
³
1
1−ψ
´ 1
1−α
.
Given this assumption, (i) E firms prefer delegation to centralization and (ii) young
entrepreneurs find it optimal to invest in the family business. If Assumption 1 were not
satisfied, there would be no E firms in equilibrium. Thus, a sufficiently large productivity
difference is necessary to trigger economic transition.
Consider, next, the contract between banks and entrepreneurs. The E firm’s capital
stock comprises the savings of the young entrepreneur and the bank loan, kEt = sEt−1 +
lEt−1. The incentive-compatibility constraint of the entrepreneur implies that RllE ≤
ηρE
¡
sE + lE
¢
. This constraint is binding if and only if η < Rl/ρE, which we assume to
be the case. Thus, the share of investments financed through bank loans is
lE
lE + sE
=
ηρE
Rl
. (7)
The entrepreneur’s investment problem can be expressed as the choices of lE and sE
that maximize discounted utility, U, subject to c1 = m− sE, c2 = ρE (lE + sE)− RllE,
and the incentive-compatibility constraint, (7). If we use (7) to substitute away lE, the
problem simplifies to
max
sE
(m− sE)1−
1
θ − 1
1− 1θ
+ β
³
(1−η)ρERl
Rl−ηρE
sE
´1− 1θ − 1
1− 1θ
.
This implies that the optimal savings are sE = ζEm, where ζE ≡
µ
1 + β−θ
³
(1−η)ρERl
Rl−ηρE
´1−θ¶−1
.
3.2 Discussion of Assumptions
Before discussing our model’s equilibrium dynamics, we review the main assumptions
made so far.
The theory describes a growth model characterized by heterogeneous firms that differ
in productivity and access to credit markets. In the application to China, the natural
empirical counterparts of E firms and F firms are private and state-owned enterprises,
respectively. In our model, we do not emphasize the public ownership of less produc-
tive firms. However, we focus on two salient features that are related to the ownership
structure. First, due to their internal bureaucratic structure, SOE are weak in corpo-
rate governance and grant less autonomy and incentives to their management. This
feature is well documented. For instance, Liu and Otsuka (2004) show that profit-linked
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managerial compensation schemes are rare for SOE, while they are ten to twenty times
more prevalent for township and village enterprises. The rigidity of the SOE structure is
emphasized by Chang and Wong (2004). Second, thanks to connections to state-owned
banks, SOE enjoy better access to borrowing (as suggested in the evidence discussed in
Section 2).
In assuming F firms to be "competitive," we abstract from other institutional fea-
tures, such as market power or distortions in the objectives pursued by firms and their
managers, that may be important in Chinese SOE. We do so partly for tractability. Chi-
nese SOE have been subject to an increased competitive pressure that has forced many
of them to shut down or restructure. Thus, to focus on the two distortions discussed
above, we find the abstraction of competitive profit-maximizing firms to be fruitful (in
section 5.2 we explore the implications of granting F firms market power). Also for sim-
plicity, we model the labor market as competitive and frictionless. While the Chinese
labor market is characterized by important frictions (e.g., barriers to geographical mo-
bility), we do not think that including such frictions would change any of the qualitative
predictions of the theory, although it would affect the speed of reallocation and wage
growth.
The assumption that private firms are less financially integrated is also well rooted
in the empirical evidence discussed in section 2, showing that Chinese private firms rely
heavily on self-financing and receive only limited funding from banks and insignificant
equity funding. The assumption that monitoring is easier within flexible organizations
— and most notably in family firms — seems natural. In the model, we do not emphasize
inter-family altruistic links: parents transmit genetically entrepreneurial skills to their
children, but also must provide them with incentives to avoid opportunistic behavior.
Alternatively, we could have focused on parental altruism and assumed that incentive
problems are altogether absent in family firms. In such an alternative model, parents
would leave voluntary bequests to their children, who in turn would invest in the family
firm.
The essential feature of our model’s reallocation mechanism is that financial and con-
tractual frictions obstruct the flow of capital towards high-productivity entrepreneurial
firms. If the entrepreneurs could borrow external funds without impediments, the tran-
sition would occur instantaneously, and only the more efficient E firms would be active
in equilibrium. The fact that entrepreneurs must rely on their own savings implies a
gradual transition.
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3.3 Equilibrium during Transition
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium dynamics during a transition in which
there is positive employment in both E and F firms. We drop time subscripts when this
causes no confusion. We start by showing that, due to the disadvantage in raising funds,
E firms choose in equilibrium a lower capital-output ratio than do F firms. To see this,
denote by κJ ≡ kJ/ (AJnJ) the capital per effective unit of labor. As discussed above,
in a competitive equilibrium, the lending rate Rl pins down the marginal product of
capital among F firms. Thus,
κF =
³ α
Rl
´ 1
1−α
. (8)
Since κF is constant, the equilibrium wage in (2) grows at the rate of technical change,
z, as in standard neoclassical open-economy growth models. Equation (5) then implies
immediately that
κE = κF ((1− ψ)χ)−
1
α . (9)
Lemma 1 Let Assumption 1 hold, i.e., χ > χ. Then E firms have a lower capital-output
ratio (κE < κF ) and a lower capital-labor ratio than have F firms.
Consider, next, the equilibrium dynamics. The key properties of the model are that
(i) KEt and At are state variables (whereas KFt is determined by equation (8) and is
therefore not a state variable), (ii) capital per effective unit of labor for each type of
firm, κE and κF , is constant among each type of firm, and (iii) entrepreneurial savings in
period t (hence, KEt+1) is linear in KEt. These three properties imply that employment,
capital and output among E firms grow at a constant rate during transition.
Lemma 2 Given KEt and At, the equilibrium dynamics of total capital and employment
among E firms during transition are given by KEt+1/KEt = 1 + γKE and NEt+1/NEt =¡
1 + γKE
¢
/ (1 + z) ≡ 1 + νE, where
1 + γKE =
Rl
Rl − ηρE
Ã
1 + β−θ
µ
(1− η) ρERl
Rl − ηρE
¶1−θ!−1 ψ
1− ψ
ρE
α
, (10)
and ρE = (1− ψ)
1
α χ
1−α
α Rl and Rl = R/ (1− ξ) . There exists χˆ = χˆ (β, χ, ψ, η, α, ν, z,R, ξ) <
∞ such that the employment share of E firms NE/N grows over time (i.e., νE > ν) if
and only if χ > χˆ. χˆ is defined in the Appendix. Moreover, χˆ is decreasing in β and in
η and increasing in ν and in z. Thus, the employment share of E firms grows if, ceteris
paribus, β or η are sufficiently large or if ν or z are sufficiently small.
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Equation (10) follows from the aggregation of the E firm investments, after recalling
that kEt+1 = sEt + lEt , where sEt = ζ
Emt (with mt being determined by (4)), and lEt is
determined by (7). The constant growth rate of K hinges on the facts that the rate
of return to capital in E firms is constant and that young entrepreneurs’ earnings and
savings are proportional to E firms’ profits. To illustrate this point, suppose that z = 0.
In this case, the workers’ wage remains constant during the transition. However, the
managerial compensation, mt, still grows in proportion to the output of E firms. The
growing earning inequality between workers and entrepreneurs is key for the transition
to occur, since (i) the investment of E firms is financed by entrepreneurial savings, and
(ii) constant wages avoid a falling return to investment. If young entrepreneurs earned
no rents and just earned a workers’ wage, entrepreneurial investments would not grow
over time. Substituting the expression of ρE into (10) shows that the growth rate is
hump-shaped in ψ. If entrepreneurial rents are lows (small ψ), young entrepreneurs are
poor, and there is low investment. However, if ψ is large, the profitability and growth
of E firms (ρE) fall.
Note that both assumptions, that χ > χ and that χ > χˆ, require the TFP gap, χ1−α,
to be large. Thus, generically, only one of them will be binding. Interestingly, the theory
can predict failed take-offs. For instance, suppose that initially both conditions are
satisfied. Then, the saving rate ζE falls, due to, e.g., a fall in β, so that χˆ (., β) > χ > χ
after the shock. Then investment by E firms would continue to be positive, but their
employment share would shrink over time.
The equilibrium dynamics of the set of F firms can be characterized residually from
the condition thatKFt = κFAt (Nt −NEt), namely, F firms hire all workers not employed
by the E firms, and KF adjusts to the optimal capital-labor ratio. Standard algebra
shows that, as long as the employment share of E firms increases, the growth rate
of KF declines over time.17 Aggregate capital accumulation among F firms is hump-
shaped during the transition. Initially, when the employment share of E firms is small,
KF grows at a positive rate (provided that either ν > 0 or z > 0). However, as the
transition proceeds, its growth rate declines and eventually turns negative.
17More formally,
KFt+1
KFt
=
AFt+1
AFt
NFt+1
NFt
= (1 + z) (1 + ν)
Ã
1− NE0
N0
µ
1 + νE
1 + ν
¶t+1!
/
Ã
1− NE0
N0
µ
1 + νE
1 + ν
¶t!
≡ 1+γKF t,
where ddt
¡
1 + γKF ,t
¢
= (1 + z) NE0N0
³
1+νE
1+ν
´t ³
ln 1+νE1+ν
´
(ν − νE)
µ
1−
³
1+νE
1+ν
´t¶−2
< 0 iff νE > ν.
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Finally, standard algebra shows that GDP per worker is given by
Yt
Nt
=
YFt + YEt
Nt
= καF
µ
1 +
ψ
1− ψ
NEt
Nt
¶
At. (11)
The growth rate of GDP per worker accelerates during a transition as long as χ >
χˆ, reflecting the resource reallocation towards more efficient firms. Under the same
condition, the average rate of return to capital in the economy increases during the
transition, even though the rates of return to capital in E firms and F firms are constant.
Intuitively, we know that this reflects the increasing share of the capital stock that yields
the high return ρE.18
Figure 7 illustrates the transitional dynamics of employment, wages, output, the
average rate of return, foreign reserve over GDP and the saving rate in the model
economy. In the figure, the transition ends in period T , when all workers are employed
by E firms. During the transition, the employment share of these firms, the average rate
of return and output per effective units of labor grow, whereas wages per effective units
remain constant.
FIGURE 7 HERE
3.4 Foreign Surplus, Savings, and Investments
In this section, we derive the implications of the model for the accumulation of foreign
reserves, which is a focal point of our theory. Consider the banks’ balance sheet:
KFt +
ηρE
Rl
KEt +Bt = ζWwt−1Nt−1. (12)
The left-hand side of (12) consists of the banks’ assets: lending to F firms, lending to
E firms (as in equation (7)), and purchasing of foreign bonds, Bt. The right-hand side
of (12) captures their liabilities (deposits). The analysis of the previous section leads to
the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 The country’s foreign surplus is given by
Bt =
µ
ζW
(1− α)κα−1F
(1 + z) (1 + ν)
− 1 + (1− η) NEt
Nt
¶
κFAtNt. (13)
18More formally, the average rate of return is
ρt =
ρEKE,t + ρFKF,t
KE,t +KF,t
=
Rl
1−
³
1− χ ((1− ψ)χ)−
1
α
´
NEt
Nt
,
which is increasing as long as NEt/Nt increases.
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As long as the employment share of the E firms (NEt/Nt) increases during the tran-
sition, the country’s foreign surplus per efficiency unit, Bt/(AtNt), increases. When
the transition is completed (in period T , say) and all workers are employed by E firms
(NET/NT = 1), the net foreign position becomes
BT =
¡
ζW (1− α)κα−1F / ((1 + z) (1 + ν))− η
¢
καFATNT . If E firms are sufficiently credit
constrained (i.e., if η is low), then the transition necessarily ends with a positive net
foreign position.
The intuition for the growing foreign surplus is that as employment is reallocated
towards the more productive E firms, investment in the financially integrated F firms
shrinks. Hence, the demand for domestic borrowing falls and banks must shift their
portfolio towards foreign bonds. Although there is a potentially increasing demand of
loans from E firms, this is small, due to the financial frictions. The growth rate of the
foreign surplus can exceed that of GDP, resulting in a growing Bt/Yt ratio (as in panel
5 of Figure 7). This is the case if ψ and η are sufficiently small, i.e., if (asymmetric)
credit market and/or contractual imperfections are sufficiently severe.19
During the transition, the country’s gross saving rate, St/Yt (where St = ζWwtNt +
ζEμmt), increases (panel 6 of Figure 7), whereas the gross investment rate, It/Yt (where
It = KEt+1+KFt+1), falls. Both forces contribute to the growing foreign surplus during
the transition. The aggregate saving rate grows for two reasons. First, workers employed
by the F firms earn a constant share, 1 − α, of the output of those firms, and save a
fraction ζW . In contrast, workers employed by E firms save a fraction ζW (1− α) (1− ψ)
of the output of those firms. Second, young entrepreneurs save a share ζEψ. Thus, the
saving rate out of the output of E firms equals (1− α) ζW +αψζE+(1− α)ψ
¡
ζE − ζW
¢
which exceeds the saving rate out of the output of F firms, since ζE ≥ ζW .20
19More formally,
Bt
Yt
=
ζW (1−α)κ
α−1
F
(1+z)(1+ν) − 1 + (1− η)
NEt
Nt
1 + ψ1−ψ
NEt
Nt
κ1−αF ,
which is increasing with NEt/Nt provided that
ψ
1− η (1− ψ) <
α (1 + ν) (1 + z)
(1− α)
1 + β−θR1−θ
Rl
.
The set of parameters satisfying this condition together with assumption 1 and the condition of Lemma
2 is non-empty.
20To see this, recall that ρE > Rl. Since the intertemporal elasticity of substitution θ ≥ 1, the young
entrepreneurs have a higher saving rate than the workers: ζE ≥ ζW . This is the only result in the paper
that hinges on the restriction that θ ≥ 1.
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Next, consider the country’s investment. Suppose, for simplicity, that z = ν = 0.
Then every worker who is shifted from an F firm to an E firm works with less capital.
Therefore, domestic investment falls during the transition (a result which generalizes to
positive z and ν). This prediction is problematic, and we shall return to it in section
3.7. For the moment, we note that the prediction of a growing foreign surplus does not
hinge on a falling investment rate since the saving rate is growing during the transition.
The following proposition summarizes the main results so far.
Proposition 1 Suppose that χ > max{χ, χˆ}. Then, during the transition, the equilib-
rium employment among the two sets of firms is given byNEt = KEt/
³
AtκF (1− ψ)−1/α χ−(1−α)/α
´
and NFt = Nt − NEt, where κF is given by (8), and KEt and At are predetermined in
period t. The rate of return to capital is constant over time for both types of firms, and
higher in the E than in F firms: ρF = Rl and ρE = (1− ψ)1/α χ(1−α)/αRl. Capital and
employment in E firms grow over time as in Lemma 2. The stock of foreign assets per
efficiency unit grows over time, as in equation (13). If ψ and/or η are small (strong
contractual imperfections and/or credit market discrimination against entrepreneurs),
then the foreign surplus-to-GDP ratio increases during the transition.
3.5 Post-Transition Equilibrium
Once the transition is completed (in period T in Figure 7) all workers are employed
by E firms. Thereafter, the theory predicts standard OLG-model dynamics. Consider,
for instance, the case of θ → 1 (log preferences). Then, the aggregate capital stock is
given by KEt+1 = (β/ (1 + β))
¡
Rl/
¡
Rl − ηρEt
¢¢
mt, which implies — after substituting
in the equilibrium expressions of mt and ρEt — a standard neoclassical law of motion (see
Appendix):
κEt+1 =
β
1 + β
ψ
(1 + z) (1 + ν)
Rl
Rl − ηα (1− ψ)κα−1Et
(κEt)
α . (14)
Investments bring about capital deepening until either the rate of return to capital falls
to Rl or the capital per efficiency unit converges to a steady state such that the rate of
return to capital exceeds Rl. Along the converging path, wages and output per effective
units, as well as the net foreign surplus, increase, while the rate of return to capital falls.
3.6 Discussion of Results
China: The theory we have just described fits some salient qualitative features of the
recent Chinese growth experience discussed in section 2. First, in spite of the high
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investment and growth of industrial production, the rate of return of firms does not fall.
Second, E firms — similarly to DPE in China — have a higher TFP and less access to
external financing than other firms. This induces a lower capital intensity in E firms than
in F firms (Lemma 1) — again in line with the empirical evidence. Moreover, the rate of
return to capital is higher in E firms than in F firms, just as in the data DPE are more
profitable than SOE. Third, the transition is characterized by factor reallocation from
financially integrated firms to entrepreneurial firms, which is similar to the reallocation
from SOE to DPE in the data. Fourth, such reallocation leads to an external imbalance —
as in the data the economy runs a sustained foreign surplus. Finally, the model predicts
a growing inequality between workers’ wages and entrepreneurial earnings.
Allocation Puzzle: While the focus of our paper is on China, our model can also cast
light on the experience of other industrializing countries. Our model provides a potential
explanation for Gourinchas and Jeanne’s (2007) observation that developing countries
with high (low) TFP growth experience current account surpluses (deficits). The hall-
mark of our model is the reallocation from less to more financially constrained firms,
which sustains high productivity growth and feeds a growing gap between domestic sav-
ing and investment.21 According to Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), capital flows out of
Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s represent two canonical examples of the "allocation puz-
zle". Similar to China twenty years later, those economies experienced an acceleration
of productivity growth at a time in which they run large balance of payment surpluses.22
Korea: In the 1960s and 1970s, the industrialization process of South Korea relied sub-
stantially on foreign loans. As of the early 1980s, Korea had one of the highest ratios of
foreign debt to GDP ratio among developing countries. The imbalance was significantly
corrected in the 1980s. Especially in the second half of that decade, Korea experienced
booming growth and a sequence of large current account surpluses. This structural
change coincided with important changes in the Korean development strategy. In the
period 1960-80, the government had provided strong support to the large local conglom-
erates (chaebol). One pillar of this strategy was a strong integration between banks and
chaebol that granted the latter privileged access to low-cost credit. Barriers to entry
were substantial. In 1980, the ten largest chaebol accounted for 48% of the Korean GNP
(Kim, 1997), while the employment share of manufacturing of small and medium enter-
21Note that a low χ can make our mechanism go in reverse. As discussed above, if χ < χ < χˆ, the
employment share of the E firms would fall over time, causing low TFP growth and a falling foreign
balance. This is reminiscent of the negative part of the allocation puzzle.
22The annual growth rate of GDP per worker went up from 4.5% (1972-82) to 6.9% (1982-92) in
Korea, and from 5.3% (1972-82) to 6.8% (1982-92) in Taiwan (Penn World Tables 6.2).
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prises (SME) with fewer than 200 workers had declined from 68% in 1960 to less than
50% in 1980. Following the crisis of 1979-80, the Korean government set out a major
policy shift. The Fair Trade Act of 1980 introduced a set of measures aimed to favor
competition and the entry of small firms, by, e.g., reducing subsidies to large firms, regu-
lating the chaebol’ monopoly power, and offering tax breaks to SME (Smith, 1994). As a
result, the activity of SME soared. Their number more than doubled between 1980 and
1990 (Suh 1998, Table 3.13), and their employment share in manufacturing increased to
62%, a trend that continued in the early 1990s (Nugent and Yhee, 2002, Table I). While
the Korean reform package included a minimum financial liberalization (privatization
of commercial banks) there were no major financial reforms until the 1993-97 Financial
Sector Reform Plan. Thus, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, while growing in
number and importance, SME continued to be subject to heavy discrimination in credit
markets (Park, 1994, and Shin and Park, 1999). Similar to China, the differential access
to bank loans in Korea resulted in different capital intensities: in the period 1979-97
the ratio of gross value added to total assets was 46% higher in large enterprises than
in SME. Moreover, again similar to China, "in the latter half of the 1980s the chaebol
placed an increasingly disproportionate emphasis on capital-intensive industries, using
their ability to raise funds as the main source of their competitiveness" (Smith, 2000, p.
64). During the same period, the chaebol system showed increasing cracks, resulting in
a growing share of non-performing loans and frequent government-sponsored bail-outs.23
Taiwan: Taiwan recorded trade deficits in all but two years during 1951-70 (the sur-
pluses in 1964 and 1966, were merely 0.75% and 0.27% of GDP, respectively). Thereafter,
the trade balance turned consistently positive, except during the oil shock (1974-75) and
in 1980 which had a tiny deficit. The size of the surplus became especially remarkable in
the 1980s: the annual net export-GDP ratio was a staggering 12% in 1982-88. Compared
with Korea’s, the Taiwanese SME played a more important role all along the process
of industrialization. Nevertheless, the U-shaped trajectory of the Taiwanese SME share
is reminiscent of that of Korea: the employment share of firms employing fewer than
23Park and Kim (1994, p. 212) note that “. . . it was an open secret that Korea’s commercial banks
were awash in a sea of nonperforming loans.” To remedy this situation, the government often identified
healthy companies in the same chaebol and induced them to absorb the troubled companies in exchange
for subsidies or preferential credit arrangements. For instance, in 1978 and 1986, Daewoo acquired at the
government’s request the Kyungnam enterprise, receiving in exchange preferential loans for 230 million
USD and a transfer from the Korean Development Bank for 50 million dollars to bail out its shipbuilding
activity that was in distress. This influx of money contributed significantly to the subsequent expansion
of Daewoo. The Daewoo case is a good example of how credit arrangements were biased in favor of
large chaebol.
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100 persons fell from 58% in 1961 to 36% in 1971, and then went up again to 59% in
1991. This reversal was encouraged by policy changes, such as the plan of economic
liberalization of 1984 (Smith 1997).
Although bank-firm ties were weaker than in Korea and mainland China, access
to credit markets was highly unequal across Taiwanese firms. Public and large private
enterprises satisfied more than 90% of their external borrowing from the formal financial
sector, while SME had to rely on the informal curb market for a large fraction of their
financial needs.24 Shea (1994) reports that "over the 1965-88 period the rate of loans from
financial institutions relative to value added averaged 47 percent for public enterprises but
only 29 percent for private enterprises" (p. 242). This was largely due to an "emphasis
on collaterals rather than the profitability or productivity of the borrowers" (p. 241).
The interest in the informal lending market were more than twice as high as the bank
lending rate for unsecured loans (see Smith, 1997, Table 6). Shea (1994) concludes that
"easier access to bank loans by public enterprises and large firms inevitably induced them
to adopt more capital-intensive technologies, the result of which is a higher productivity
for labor and a lower productivity for capital in larger enterprises relative to private
and medium and small enterprises. If we could reallocate resources in such a way to
shift some capital from public and large enterprises to private and medium and small
enterprises... the total productivity of the whole economy might increase" (p. 244).
Given these premises, the growth in the share of credit-constrained SME during the 1980s
contributed to productivity growth in Taiwan. Interestingly, the timing of reallocation
coincides with the massive accumulation of foreign reserves.
Summary: In conclusion, in spite of important differences, the 1980s experiences of
Korea and Taiwan share some commonalities with the recent development of China.
All featured a pronounced reallocation within the manufacturing sector characterized
by a strong growth of credit-constrained high-productivity firms. The reallocation was
accompanied on the macroeconomic front by an acceleration in productivity growth and
foreign surplus. These features are consistent with the predictions of our theory.
24The Taiwanese curb market consists of all borrowing and lending activities occurring outside of
the supervision and regulation of monetary authorities. According to Smith (1997), private enterprises
borrowed 35% of their external finance from such an informal market in the period 1981-87. In the
same period, SME borrowed about four times as much from it as did large enterprises (see Smith, 2000,
Table 4.3).
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3.7 Financial Development
In section 3.4, we noted that the theory predicts falling investment rates during the
transition. Different from a standard neoclassical growth model, the investment rate does
not fall in our theory because of capital deepening bringing about decreasing returns.
Rather, the fall is due to a composition effect: financially constrained firms — which have
a lower capital-output ratio — expand, while financially unconstrained firms contract.
However, in the Chinese experience there is no evidence of a falling investment rate: Bai
et al. (2006) document that this rate has instead followed an U-shaped pattern over the
period 1992-2006.
One way to reconcile our theory with the data is to introduce a mechanism that
generates capital deepening within both E and F firms. A simple such mechanism is a
reduction of financial frictions during the transition. This change is motivated by the
observation that over the last decade the Chinese government has made considerable
effort to improve the financial system. For instance, the lending market has been dereg-
ulated, allowing for both more competition and more flexibility in the pricing of loans.25
A symptom of the improvement in the efficiency of the banking system is the sharp
reduction in the ratio of non-performing loans.26
We incorporate financial development into our theory by letting the iceberg inter-
mediation cost, ξ, fall over time: Rlt = R/ (1− ξt). Ceteris paribus, a reduction in ξ
and Rlt pushes up wages and capital-labor ratios in both E and F firms. A sufficiently
sharp reduction in ξ over time can offset the tendency for the investment rate to fall
(and for the average rate of return to increase). A reduction of ξ slows transition via two
channels: (i) it increases wages, which in turn strengthens the comparative advantage
of F firms — entrepreneurs must save more to attract workers from F firms — and (ii)
it reduces ρE and the saving rate of entrepreneurs.27 We will return to the effects of
financial development in the next section.
25Before 1996, banks in China had to lend at the official lending rate. In 1996, a reform allowed them
to set the rate between 0.9 and 1.1 times the official rate. The upper limit gradually increased to 1.3
times for small and medium enterprises in the late 1990s and was eventually removed completely in
2004 (Podpiera, 2006). The increase in competition can also be seen in the loan share of the four major
state-owned banks which fell from 61% in 1999 to 53% in 2004 and by the growing equity market.
26In state-owned banks, the non-performing loan ratio has fallen from 26% in 2002 to 10% in 2005.
Although part of this improvement can be attributed to a government bail-out, this ratio for new loans
after 2000 is reported to have fallen drastically compared with older loans (Podpiera, 2006).
27An alternative form of financial development would be a reduction of η, i.e., better credit market
access for entrepreneurs. This would unambiguously speed up transition without affecting either capital
intensity (κE) or wages. In China, there is no clear evidence that credit market access of DPE improved
relative to SOE, see Figure 4.
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4 Quantitative Analysis
We have focused so far on qualitative predictions of the theory. In this section, we show
that a calibrated version of our theory can also account quantitatively for China’s growth
experience during 1992-2007. In particular, it captures the rise in private employment,
the rise in foreign surplus and the U-shaped rates of investment and aggregate savings.
4.1 The Quantitative Multi-Period Model
Given the goal to match the theory with China’s experience over the last fifteen years,
a two-period OLG model, in which one period corresponds to thirty years, would be
inadequate. Therefore, we extend our theory to an Auerbach-Kotlikoff OLG model,
in which agents live T periods. Preferences are CRRA as in the model above, U =PT
t=1 β
t
³
(ct)
1−1/θ − 1
´
/ (1− 1/θ). Agents are born with zero wealth and cannot die
with negative wealth. Workers supply one unit of labor each period. They retire after J
years of work. Their lifetime budget constraint is
PT
t=1R
−tct =
PJ
t=1R
−twt, where wt
is the wage in period t.
Young entrepreneurs work as managers for T/2 periods and as entrepreneurs for
the remaining T/2 periods — in line with the two-period model above. During their
management phase, they deposit their savings in banks. As they become entrepreneurs,
they invest their accumulated wealth,
PT/2
t=1 R
T/2−t (mt − ct) , in E firms. They borrow
part of the capital from banks, as in the two-period model (see equation (7)). After
becoming entrepreneurs, their budget constraint becomes
ct + sE,t+1 =
RltρEt
Rlt − ηρEt
sEt,
where the net return on equity, RltρEt/
¡
Rlt − ηρEt
¢
, incorporates the gain from levering
up equity by borrowing at a rate Rlt.
Given an aggregate entrepreneurial capital KEt, prices and aggregate allocations are
determined as in the two-period model. However, capital no longer depreciates fully,
so the law of motion for aggregate capital is Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It, where δ < 1
denotes the constant depreciation rate. Equations (2), (4), (5) and (7) are unchanged,
while equations (3), (6), (8) and (9) are modified to incorporate the new assumption that
δ < 1. To avoid the counterfactual prediction of declining investment rates, we follow the
discussion in Section 3.7 and allow ξt to change over time due to financial development.
Aggregate savings equal aggregate production minus consumption minus intermediation
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costs. Aggregate bank deposits is the aggregate financial wealth of workers, retirees and
managers. The initial distribution of wealth is the only state variable. Given this, the
model is solved by standard iteration on the sequence of wage rates {wt}∞t=0.28
4.2 Calibration
The calibration of our multi-period model focuses on matching empirical moments during
1998-2005 because this is the period covered by NBS. Some parameters are calibrated
exogenously. The rest are estimated within the model.
Parameters Set Exogenously: One period is one year. Agents enter the economy
at age 28 and live until 78 (T = 50). The average retirement age in China is 58, so
workers retire after J = 30 years of work. The annual deposit rate is R = 1 + 1.75%,
which is the average one-year real deposit rate (deflated by the CPI) during 1998-2005.
The capital share is set to α = 0.5, consistent with Bai et al. (2006), and the annual
depreciation rate of capital is set to δ = 10%. The annual population growth rate is set
to ν = 3%, which is the average urban population growth during 1998-2005 (according to
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators). Finally, the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is set to θ = 2.
Parameters Set Endogenously: The remaining parameters are estimated within in
the model:
• The discount factor β is calibrated to match China’s average aggregate saving rates
during 1998-2005. This gives β = 0.997.
• Recall that SOE report to have a more than three times larger share of investments
financed through bank loans than do DPE (Figure 4). Since DPE have some
alternative sources of financing in addition to bank loans and withheld earnings,
such as friends and family, we assume that E firms can finance externally half their
investments. This implies a maximum share profits entrepreneurs can pledge to
repay of η = 0.86.29
28Given a guess for {wt}∞t=0 and the initial wealth distribution, the prices and allocations are given
by the modified version of (2)-(9) and the individuals’ savings problems. Recall that in equilibrium wt
must be given by (2) as long as NEt < Nt, and it is given by neoclassical dynamics after the end of the
transition. If the implied allocations are consistent with the guess for {wt}∞t=0, then an equilibrium has
been found. Otherwise, update the guess for {wt}∞t=0. Iterate until convergence.
29In the data, even SOE finance about half of their investments through internal savings (China
Fixed Asset Investment Statistical Yearbook, various issues). However, this observation is per se no
evidence of SOE being subject to large credit constraints. For our purposes, it is crucial that DPE be
significantly more credit constrained than SOE. Therefore, we retain the convenient assumption that
SOE are unconstrained.
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• The parameters χ and ψ are set so as to match two empirical moments: (i) the
capital-output ratio of Chinese SOE is 2.65 times larger than that of DPE (average
1998-2005); and (ii) the rate of return to capital is 9% higher among E firms than
F firms (in line with Figure 3 and Islam et al., 2006). This yields χ = 4.79 and
ψ = 0.45. This calibration implies a TFP gap of 2.2, which is in the upper end of
the range of the estimates in the literature discussed in Section 2.30
• The initial iceberg intermediation cost ξ is set so that the gross aggregate rate
of return to capital is 20% in the 1990s (in line with the estimates of Bai et
al., 2006). This implies that ρF = 9.3%, ρE = 18.3% and ξt = ξ = 0.069 for
1992 ≤ t < 2000. For t ≥ 2000, the sequence of intermediation costs {ξt}∞t=2000 is
calibrated so as to best fit, given the other calibrated parameters, the behavior of
aggregate investment. In particular, we assume that ξt = 0 for t ≥ 2020 and set
ξt = (1− ((t− 2000) /19)υ) ξ for t ∈ [2000, 2019], where υ = 2.38 is set to match
the aggregate investment rate in 2007. The ρF,t implied by the assumed sequence
of ξt is illustrated in panel 1 of Figure 8.
• The rate of secular labor-augmenting technical progress is set to z = 3.8% so as to
target an annual 11.2% output growth rate over 1998-2005. This is slightly lower
than the output growth rate of China’s urban areas (based on the 35 largest cities,
11.7%) and slightly higher than the growth rate of industrial output (10.4%).
Initial Conditions: The initial entrepreneurial wealth is set so as to match the average
DPE employment share during 1998-2005. This yields a 1992 E firm employment share
of 3%, which is close to the empirical observation. The initial life-cycle distribution of
wealth for managers and entrepreneurs is similar to a scaled-up version of the distribution
of wealth over the life cycle for workers in the initial steady state. The initial assets of
the workers and retirees are set to 60% of the wealth in a steady state where there are
only F firms. This ensures that the model matches China’s net foreign surplus-to-GDP
ratio in 1992.
FIGURE 8 HERE
30The comparison between TFP in the model and in the data is complicated by the peculiar technology
of our E firms. An income-based TFP calculation that excluded the payments to management would
yield a TFP gap of 1.62. Given this ambiguity, we chose to calibrate χ so as to match the observed
rates of return to capital rather than matching TFP differences.
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4.3 Results
The dynamics of the calibrated multi-period economy are illustrated in Figure 8. Panels
2-6 display various salient macroeconomic outcomes of the model versus the data.
First of all, the calibrated economy generates a speed of employment reallocation
comparable to its empirical counterpart (panel 2). Second, the aggregate saving rate
(panel 3) tracks remarkably well the U-shaped dynamics of the Chinese aggregate saving
rate. Recall that the economy is calibrated to match the average saving rate, but not its
time path. The decline during the 1990s is due to the assumption of low initial wealth
of workers, implying that they save a lot initially. The rise after 2000 is driven by the
fast reallocation towards E firms, the managers of which have high saving rates. This
is the mechanism driving increased savings in the two-period model (Figure 7). Third,
the calibrated model matches closely the trend of the net foreign surplus (panel 5),
although the predicted growth is slightly too high in 1998-2002 and slightly too low in
2003-2007. Since the model matches the saving rate, its success in this dimension hinges
on predicting accurately the investment rate (panel 4). This was not a calibration target
because ξt determines the investment’s dynamics, not its level. Interestingly, the model
predicts an acceleration in the foreign surplus from 2007 onwards. This is driven by a
continued increase in the saving rate and a declining investment rate.
Consider now the evolution of aggregate TFP, computed as a standard Solow residual
of a one-sector aggregate production function using aggregate capital and labor as inputs.
This is plotted in panel 6. The 1998-2005 annualized growth rate is 5.9%. This is in the
range of the estimates from empirical productivity studies. Bosworth and Collins (2008)
estimate a TFP growth rate in industry of 6.1% over the period 1993-2004. Brandt et
al. (2009) report estimates of the annual TFP growth of 4% and 7.7%.31
We can decompose the TFP growth rate into one part due to exogenous technical
change and another part due to reallocation. Reallocation yields 4.2% annual TFP
growth. Thus, about 70% of the 1998-2005 TFP growth in our model is driven by
reallocation from old, inefficient F firms to new, and more efficient E firms. This large
effect is broadly consistent with the findings of Brandt et al. (2009), who estimate that
between 42% and 67% of the aggregate TFP growth in Chinese manufacturing was due
to productivity differences between firms entering and exiting during 1998-2005. They
31Brandt et al. (2009) use the NBS. The 4% estimate is obtained by calculating the difference between
the weighted average productivity level of all firms active in 2006 and in 1998 (Table 7). The 7.7%
estimate is the authors’ "preferred estimate" found by averaging year-to-year productivity growth over
the entire sample of firms (Figure 3).
28
also document that SOE and collectively owned enterprises represent the lion’s share
of exiting firms, while most that enter are DPE. See their Figure 1.32 However, our
model implies a substantially larger gain from reallocation than what Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) estimate; they find an annual TFP growth gain from reallocation between Chinese
manufacturing firms of 2%. Finally, the model predicts an increasing TFP growth over
time (panel 6). This is also consistent with Brandt et al. (2009), who find an even
steeper increase in the growth rate than predicted by our model.
Finally, our model implies an average wage growth of 5% per year, which is resonable.
See footnote 2 for a detailed comparison with the data. In the model, wage growth arises
from both technical change and capital deepening. The assumption of a competitive and
frictionless labor market implies that during transition the growth of DPE has no effect
on wages. Introducing frictions may deliver higher wage growth.
The most problematic feature of our calibration concerns the average rates of return
within SOE and within DPE. In the calibration these rates fall due to financial develop-
ment (recall that ρF and ρE would be constant in the absence of financial development).
However, Figure 3 suggests that both rates of return increased during 1998-2005. This
hints at the presence of additional sources of efficiency gains within SOE and DPE that
offset the decreasing returns. In part, this discrepancy can be related to the stark way
in which we have mapped the theory into the data. In particular, we have interpreted F
and E firms as SOE and DPE, respectively, abstracting from within-group heterogeneity.
Since our theory emphasizes reallocation across firms of heterogeneous productivities, it
is natural to expect that some reallocation took place within each group, e.g., through
the exit of less productive SOE and DPE. A simple extension of our theory where entre-
preneurs differ in human capital and productivity (i.e., with a distribution of χi across E
firms) would be consistent with the observation of an increasing return to capital within
DPE. Intuitively, since the growth of E firms is constrained by retained earnings, more
productive E firms would grow faster, causing an increase of the average productivity of
E firms over time.33 No such straightforward extension works for F firms, since there can
32Brandt et al. (2009) conclude that "relative to the U.S. experience, productivity growth in China’s
manufacturing sector is to a much greater extent due to changes at the extensive margin, entry and
exit." In our model, the number of firms is indeterminate, due to constant returns to scale. Thus, we
cannot distinguish between reallocation along an extensive and an intensive margin. Therefore, our
measure of reallocation should be compared with the sum of these two margins.
33Let χi denote firm i0s productivity and Ki be the corresponding capital stock. Then, the rate of
return to capital for firm i is ρiE = (1− ψ)
1
α χ
1−α
α
i R
l. If ρEt =
P
ρiEKit/KEt denotes the average
rate of return of E firms, it is easy to show that ρE grows over time, because the growth rate of
Kit is increasing in χi. Intuitively, more efficient E firms have higher earnings and can finance larger
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be no productivity differences across them in equilibrium. This is due to the simplifying
assumption that F firms are subject to no credit constraints. In principle, one could
relax this assumption and generate reallocation within SOE. We do not pursue this ex-
tension. Instead, in the next section we explore an alternative multi-industry setup in
which F firms have market power in some industries. This extension predicts increasing
profit rates in surviving SOE.
In conclusion, this calibration exercise has shown that reallocation from F firms to
E firms can generate quantitative outcomes that are broadly in line with the empirical
facts for China, suggesting that our mechanism might be important for understanding
the empirical facts laid out in section 2.
4.4 Robustness
To illustrate the behavior of the model we examine four alternative parametrizations:
(1) no financial development, (2) no borrowing for entrepreneurs, (3) log preferences, and
(4) low TFP advantage. In each case we change β so as to match the average aggregate
saving rates during 1998-2005, as we did in the benchmark calibration. Suppose first that
there is no financial development. This case is labeled experiment 1 and is plotted against
the benchmark calibration in Figure 9. The dynamics of the no-financial-development
economy are very similar to those of the benchmark economy until 1999. As can be
anticipated from the discussion in Section 3.7, the investment rate in this experiment
falls monotonically during the transition and increases sharply when the transition is
completed. The transition is faster than in the benchmark economy because F firms are
not able to borrow at lower and lower interest rates after 1999. Thus, without financial
development the foreign reserves and TFP would grow substantially faster after 1999.
FIGURE 9 HERE
Consider now the case when entrepreneurs cannot borrow at all, i.e., η = 0 (exper-
iment 2 in Figure 9). For simplicity, we maintain the assumption that ξt is constant
(no financial development). The key difference relative to the benchmark economy is
that the transition is slower. For example, the E firm employment share reaches 20% in
2015, while in the benchmark this level is reached already in 2000. Consequently, both
investments. So they grow faster than less efficient firms, thereby increasing the average rate of return
of DPEs over time. We develop this extension in the Appendix.
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the growth in foreign surplus and TFP are substantially slower than in the benchmark
economy. The foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio, for instance, only starts to grow after 2000
and then gradually climbs up to 25% in 2017 and 50% in 2021.
To examine the role of intertemporal elasticity to substitution θ we solve the model for
θ → 1, i.e. logarithmic preferences (experiment 3 in Figure 9). We also recalibrated the
sequence {ξt}∞t=2000 so as to match the investment rate in 2007 (recall that the benchmark
economy was calibrated in the same way). The results are qualitatively similar to the
benchmark case, including a growing foreign surplus. However, the rate of transition is
substantially slower. The lower rate of transition implies a higher investment rate and a
lower growth of foreign reserves and TFP. The two-period OLG model provides intuition
for the slow transition. The entrepreneurs’ savings rate ζE is lower when θ is lower and
Lemma 2 showed that in the analytical model the speed of transition is increasing in ζE.
Finally, suppose the TFP advantage of E firms is low, χ1−α = 2.0, compared to 2.2
in the benchmark calibration. This implies a smaller difference ρE − ρF and a smaller
difference between capital-output ratios of E firms and F firms than in the benchmark
calibration. This in turn implies a slower transition because entrepreneurial firms are
less profitable. To understand why, recall that a lower χ imply a lower return ρE. This in
turn lowers the rate of transition because entrepreneurs and managers have less income
and, hence, less savings. Quantitatively, the low-χ economy is similar to experiment 3,
so we omitted it from Figure 9.
5 A Two-Sector Model
In this section, we extend the model to a two-sector environment in which industries
have different capital intensities. In such an environment, credit-market discrimination
generates an endogenous comparative advantage for E firms in labor-intensive industries,
leading them to specialize in labor-intensive industries, and induces F firms to retreat to
capital-intensive industries. This prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence of
China, where the share of SOE has declined dramatically in labor-intensive industries,
while it is still high in capital-intensive industries (Section 2). The retreat from labor-
intensive industries has further widened the gap between the capital-output ratio of SOE
and that of private firms since the mid-1990s (Dekle and Vandenbroucke, 2006).
For simplicity, we specialize the analysis to logarithmic utility and assume that η = 0;
i.e., entrepreneurs cannot get any external financing. Moreover, we assume that ν =
ξ = z = 0. None of these assumptions is essential for the results.
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5.1 Capital- and Labor-Intensive Industries
In this section, we assume the final good, Yt, to be a CES aggregate of two intermediate
goods:
Yt =
³
ϕ
¡
Y kt
¢σ−1
σ +
¡
Y lt
¢σ−1
σ
´ σ
σ−1
. (15)
The superscripts k and l stand for capital- and labor-intensive intermediate goods, re-
spectively, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between these goods. Both goods can
be produced by either E or F firms, with the following technologies:
ylJ =
¡
AlJ
¢1−α ¡klJ¢α ¡nlJ¢1−α , ykJ = ¡AkJ¢1−α kkJ , (16)
where J ∈ {E,F}. The production technology for the labor-intensive good is identical
to that of our benchmark model. The assumption that the capital-intensive good is
produced without labor is for convenience. We assume the same TFP gap between E
and F firms in the two industries. More formally, χ ≡ AkE/AkF = AlE/AlF . Raising both
AkJ and A
l
J to the power of 1−α ensures that the TFP gap is the same across industries.
We set the final good to be the numeràire. Profit maximization of final producers
subject to (15) yields that
Y k
Y l
=
µ
ϕ
P l
P k
¶σ
, (17)
where P k and P l are goods prices. The standard price aggregation holds:³
ϕσ
¡
P k
¢1−σ
+
¡
P l
¢1−σ´ 11−σ
= 1. (18)
When F firms are active in the production of the labor-intensive good, they behave as
in the benchmark model of section 3. In particular, the following analogues of equations
(2) and (8) hold:
w = P lt (1− α)AlF
¡
κlF
¢α , (19)
κlF =
µ
P lα
R
¶ 1
1−α
. (20)
In addition, when F firms are active in the production of the capital-intensive good,
perfect competition pins down its price level:
P k
¡
AkF
¢1−α
= R. (21)
Given these equilibrium conditions, we can determine the return E firms require to
invest in each industry. The following lemma characterizes the patterns of specialization
of F and E firms. Recall that KEt is predetermined by the entrepreneurial savings.
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Lemma 4 (i) If, in period t, K lF t > 0 and K
k
Ft > 0, then ρ
l
Et > ρ
k
Et, implying that
KlEt = KEt and K
k
Et = 0. (ii) If, in period t, K
l
Et > 0 and K
k
Et > 0, then R ≥ ρkFt > ρlF t,
implying that K lF t = 0 and K
k
Ft ≥ 0.
Lemma 4 characterizes the dynamics of the equilibrium in the two-sector model.
There are four distinct stages of the transition:
• Stage 1: Only F firms invest in the capital-intensive sector, while both E and F
firms invest in the labor-intensive sector. The employment share of F firms declines
as entrepreneurial investment increases. Consequently, the employment share of
F firms decreases over time in the labor-intensive industry. However, the capital-
intensive good is produced only by F firms. This is consistent with the retreat
of Chinese SOE from labor-intensive industries. Due to this specialization in the
capital-intensive industry, the average capital-output ratio of F firms increases
during the transition, consistent again with the Chinese evidence. Eventually, F
firms completely abandon the labor-intensive activity.
• Stage 2: All workers are employed by E firms. Entrepreneurs continue to invest
their savings in the labor-intensive sector since it yields a higher return than do
both foreign bonds and investment in the capital-intensive industry. However, the
labor-intensive sector’s rate of return falls over time, because employment cannot
grow, and investment leads to capital deepening. Consequently, wages grow. Even-
tually, the incentive to accumulate capital in the labor-intensive industry comes
to a halt. If χ1−α > α (1 + β) / (βψR), entrepreneurs turn to the capital-intensive
industry and the economy enters stage 3. If χ1−α < α (1 + β) / (βψR), the eco-
nomic transition stops and the capital-intensive industry remains dominated by F
firms, in spite of their lower productivity.
• Stage 3: The investment of E firms in the capital-intensive industry causes the
progressive disappearance of F firms. Eventually, no F firms are left, even in the
capital-intensive industry.
• Stage 4: The economy enters the post-transition equilibrium of section 3.5.
Table 2 summarizes the main features of each of the four stages of the transition.
The complete characterization of the equilibrium can be found in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Investment Patterns in E and F Firms, across Transition Stages
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
Industry E F E F E F E F
Labor-intensive Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
Capital-intensive No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
In conclusion, this extension of our benchmark model has shown that the presence
of asymmetric credit frictions generates comparative advantages for credit-constrained
firms to specialize in labor-intensive activities. Since the growth of E firms is only grad-
ual, we see F firms first withdrawing from labor-intensive industries and then, possibly,
from capital-intensive industries. The theory also offers the interesting possibility that
E firms never take over capital-intensive industries. The steady state may be character-
ized by high-productivity firms in labor-intensive industries and low-productivity firms
in capital-intensive industries.
5.2 Monopoly in the Capital-Intensive Industry
As discussed in section 4.3, there is evidence that profits have increased over time in
surviving SOE. This may seem puzzling since a large number of SOE have been declining.
In this section, we extend the two-sector model and assume that the labor-intensive
industry is competitive, while the capital-intensive industry is monopolized by a large F
firm. With this setup, the theory predicts that as the transition proceeds, the increased
efficiency in the labor-intensive industry increases the profit of the monopolist F firm.
The assumption that SOE have market power in capital-intensive industries is con-
sistent with the industrial policy in China. Since 1997, under the slogan "Zhuada Fangx-
iao" ("grab the big ones and release the small ones"), the Ninth Five-Year Plan exposed
SOE to competition in labor-intensive industries, while promoting the merger and re-
structuring of SOE in strategic capital-intensive sectors — e.g., petrochemicals, railway
and telecommunication — into large trans-regional groups.34 This strategy gave surviving
SOE a significant monopoly power in their industries. Arguably, this has been a main
reason why SOE profits have soared over the last ten years (Figure 3).
Without loss of generality, we normalize AkF = 1. Moreover, to guarantee that the
problem of the monopolist is well defined, we assume that σ > 1. The model is identical
to the two-sector model of section 5.1, except that the capital-intensive sector is now a
34By the end of 2001, there were 179 Chinese enterprises with value added over 500 million USD. Of
them, 165 were state-owned or state-controlled groups. The stated objective of the policy was to help
large SOE be competitive internationally like chaebol in Korea.
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legal monopoly. We assume the monopoly firm to be one-period lived, and to be owned
by a set of old agents ("bureaucrats") who are neither workers nor entrepreneurs, and
who neither produce nor consume in the first period of their lives. This implies that the
monopoly has a static objective function.35
Formally, the equilibrium allocation differs from the competitive equilibrium of sec-
tion 5.1 in two respects. First, ykE = 0, since E firms cannot enter the capital-intensive
industry. Second, equation (21) does not hold, since there is no competition driving
profits to zero in the capital-intensive industry. Instead, P k is determined by the profit-
maximizing choice of a price-setting monopolist, maxPkΠkt ≡
¡
P kt −R
¢
Kk, subject to
technology (16) and the equilibrium conditions (17), (18) and (20).
Proposition 2 The optimal markup set by the monopolist in the capital-intensive in-
dustry, P k/R, is the unique solution satisfying the following condition:Ã
σ
µ
P kt
R
¶−1
− (σ − 1)
!
=
Ã
1−
µ
P kt
R
¶−1!µ
σ − 1 + 1
1− α
Y lF t
Y lt
¶
ϕσR1−σ
¡
P k/R
¢1−σ
1− ϕσR1−σ (P k/R)1−σ
.
(22)
The optimal markup is decreasing in the share of F firms (Y lF/Y l) in the labor-intensive
industry. Thus, monopoly power increases during a transition in which the share of F
firms declines in the labor-intensive industry.
Note that the left-hand side of (22) is decreasing in P k/R, while the right-hand side
is increasing in P k. This guarantees that (22) pins down the unique equilibrium solution.
Since the right side is increasing in Y lF/Y
l, it is then immediate to establish that the
markup is decreasing in the share of F firms in the labor-intensive industry. Intuitively,
as the productivity of the labor-intensive industry increases during the transition, so
does the demand for the capital-intensive good, which strengthens the power of the
monopolist.36
35Since F firms have no equity capital and perfect access to external finance, they face no dynamic
investment problem. However, a long-lived monopoly could use its market power to affect the speed of
transition, which in turn would affect its future profits. This is an artifact of the assumption (which is
made for simplicity) that there is only one large monopolized industry in the economy. If there were a
continuum of monopolized industries, each firm would maximize its period-by-period monopoly profit,
and the results would be identical to those in this section.
36A closed-form solution obtains as σ → 1 (Cobb-Douglas). Then, P k/R = 1 +
(1− α) (1− ϕ) /
¡
ϕY lF t/Y
l
t
¢
. Note that in this particular case the markup goes to infinity as the share
of F firms goes to zero, due to the unit demand elasticity.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have constructed a neoclassical model augmented with financial and
contractual imperfections that asymmetrically affect different types of firms in the econ-
omy. The model is consistent with salient patterns of the recent Chinese experience,
most notably sustained high returns on investment in spite of high capital accumula-
tion, large productivity differences across firms, reallocation from low-productivity to
high-productivity firms (as documented by Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) and the accumula-
tion of a large foreign surplus. A calibrated version of the model has been shown to be
quantitatively consistent with these facts.
A number of simplifications that were made for the sake of tractability will be relaxed
in future research. In particular, we do not explore in depth potential determinants of
the high household savings in China. Theories of entrepreneurial savings with financial
constraints such as Quadrini (1999) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) could add new
insights to reinforce and complement the mechanism of our theory. Moreover, by assum-
ing an exogenous rate of TFP growth, we have abstracted from endogenous technology
adoption, which may be an important driver of China’s performance.
In spite of these limitations, we believe the theory explored here offers a useful tool
for understanding one of the major puzzles of the recent growth experience: how is it
that China grows at such a stellar rate and at the same time increases its foreign surplus?
Some commentators have tried to explain this puzzle by attributing it to government
manipulation of the exchange rate that holds the value of the Chinese currency artificially
low. While it is difficult to falsify theories that rely on such non-economic mechanisms, in
this paper we have provided substantial empirical evidence that corroborate the economic
mechanism of our theory.
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Table 
Dep. Variable (S-I)/GDP Growth Rate of GDP p.c. Growth Rate of VA p.w. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
D.(EMPLPRIV) 0.9964** 
(0.4889) 
0.8920* 
(0.4659) 
0.1893*** 
(0.0603) 
0.1903*** 
(0.0610) 
- - 
D.(EMPLNONSOE) - - - - 1.4257*** 
(0.4785) 
1.5973*** 
(0.3572) 
L.(GDP p.c.) - 6.6268*** 
(2.3952) 
- -0.0646 
(0.2136) 
- - 
L.(VA p.w.) - - - - - 0.1283*** 
(0.0152) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 124 124 124 124 112 112 
R2 0.0424 0.1984 0.2252 0.2258 0.2104 0.2577 
(1) Dependent variables: (S-I)/GDP*100 is the provincial ratio of net surplus over GDP. S and I stand for aggregate savings and investment, respectively. 
S=GDP-C-G, where C and G are household consumption and government consumption expenditures, respectively. GDP p.c. is the real provincial GDP per capita in 
the value of 10 thousand RMB (adjusted by provincial GDP deflators). VA p.w. is the industry value-added per worker (10 thousand RMB). Growth rates are in 
percent. 
(2) Regressors: EMPLPRIV is equal to DPE/(DPE+SOE)*100, i.e., the ratio of private employment over the sum of private and state employment. EMPLNONSOE is 
equal to (1-SOE/Total)*100, i.e., the ratio of non-SOE employment over total employment. D.(.) and L.(.) stands for the difference and the one-period lag, 
respectively. 
(3) Standard errors clustered at the province or industry level. Robust standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Figure 1 Foreign Reserves and the Difference between Deposits and Loans 
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The figure plots China’s foreign reserves (solid line) and the domestic bank deposits 
minus domestic loans (dotted line), both expressed as a percentage of GDP. Data 
source: CSY, various issues. 
Figure 2 Private Employment Share 
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The figure shows, first, the DPE share of employment as a share of SOE+DPE 
employment in manufacturing (NBS, 1998-2007) and in the urban sector (CLSY, 
1992-2007). Second, it plots DPE+FE employment as a share of total employment in 
manufacturing (NBS, 1998-2007) and in the urban sector (CLSY, 1992-2007). Data 
source: CSY and CLSY, various issues. 
Figure 3 Total Profits over Net Value of Fixed Assets 
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The figure plots the average ratio between total profits and the book value of fixed 
assets across firms of different ownership, in percent. Data source: CSY, various 
issues. 
 
Figure 4 Share of Investment Financed by Bank Loans and Government Budgets 
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The figure plots the average share of investment financed by bank loans and 
government subsidies across firms of different ownership, in percent. Date source: 
CSY 1998 to 2001 and 2003, China Economy & Trade Statistical Yearbook 2002 and 
2004. 
 
 
Figure 5 SOE Employment Shares across Industries 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Capital-labor ratio in United States
S
O
E
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t s
ha
re
, i
n 
pe
rc
en
t
Panel 1
 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
Capital-labor ratio in United States
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 S
O
E
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t s
ha
re
Panel 2
 
Panel 1 plots the 2001 employment share (in percent) of SOE in 28 major Chinese 
manufacturing industries against their respective capital-labor ratio in the United 
States. Panel 2 plots the change in SOE employment share (in percent) for these 28 
industries between 2001 and 2007. Data source: CIESY and CSY, various issues. We 
use the 1996 US capital-labor ratios, computed from NBER-CES Manufacturing 
Industry Database. The industry Petroleum and Coal Products has extremely high 
capital labor ratio and is excluded from the figures for visual convenience. 
Figure 6 Income Inequality and Private Employment Shares across Provinces 
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The figure plots the Gini coefficient of income against the DPE employment share 
across 31 Chinese provinces in 2006. The DPE share is computed as 
DPE/(DPE+SOE). Data source: CIESY 2007. Provincial Gini is from Report to the 
Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. 
Figure 7 Transition in the Analytical Model 
 
 
The figure shows the evolution of key variables during and after the transition in the 
analytical model. Time T denotes the end of the transition, when all workers are 
employed in E firms. 
 
Figure 8 Transition in the Calibrated Economy 
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The figure shows the evolution of key variables during and after the transition in the 
calibrated economy. The solid and dashed lines refer to the simulated results from 
the model and the data, respectively. The dashed and dotted lines in panel 2 refer to 
private employment shares in NBS and CLSY data, respectively (see Figure 2). 
Figure 9 Sensitivity Analysis 
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The figure shows the evolution of key variables in the calibrated economy (solid line) 
and various alternative parameterizations. Experiment 1 has a constant ξ. Experiment 
2 has η=0. Experiment 3 has logarithmic preferences.
